News Analysis The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been particularly active in projecting China’s soft power during the COVID-19 pandemic. “The fleet follows the flag,” goes the old saying. It has its roots in the arguments of the eminent 19th century naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who contended that seapower depended on trade. “Commerce was king,” he wrote, and the navy acted in support of merchant shipping. The view that “commerce is king” very much defines China’s current approach to power projection. It is evident in Beijing’s push for such China-centric initiatives as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In particular, the sea-based aspect of this plan—the so-called Maritime Silk Road—depends heavily on a network of ports and other coastal infrastructure projects, stretching from China to the Mediterranean Sea. It is also apparent in the establishment of the PLA’s first overseas military base in Djibouti, a small country in the Horn …